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An End to End-to-End? A Review 
Essay of Barbara van Schewick’s 
Internet Architecture and Innovation 
Adam Candeub* 
Barbara van Schewick’s Internet Architecture and Innovation surveys 
broad areas of computer engineering and economic theory to argue that 
some types of network neutrality regulation may be necessary to optimize 
innovation. My central critique of her argument is its use of economic 
theory to bolster one side of a highly politicized debate, rather than using 
economic analysis to clarify that debate. Van Schewick relies on an 
impressive array of economic approaches, but fails to acknowledge their 
ambiguity. Her argument strings together a succession of questionable 
economic generalizations, thereby greatly weakening her conclusions. 
Van Schewick is not alone in using economics in this way. Too many 
law professors rely on theoretical models but ignore their limiting 
assumptions, failing to sort through the massive ambiguity inherent in their 
application. A close examination of van Schewick’s argument, therefore, 
leads to general recommendations for legal interdisciplinary research 
methods. 
On December 23, 2010, the FCC released its landmark “network 
neutrality” Report and Order (“Order”).1 It prohibits a dominant Internet 
service provider, such as Verizon or Comcast, from discriminating in favor 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Director of Intellectual Property, Information, and 
Communications Program, Michigan State University College of Law. 
 1. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, Report and Order, 25 
F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010). 
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of traffic or content that it owns or with which it is affiliated.2 For example, 
the Order prohibits Comcast (or any other broadband provider) from 
blocking or degrading competitor content, such as Netflix downloads.3 
Washington, D.C. policy pandemonium greeted the Order, releasing 
the bile accumulated over the past decade of ideological debate over 
Internet openness. A Washington Post headline blared, “FCC Approves 
Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate.”4 On the right, House 
Energy and Commerce Committee Chair, Representative Fred Upton, 
vowed to “use every resource available . . . to strike down the FCC’s 
brazen effort to regulate the Internet.”5 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison 
promised to slash funding to the FCC,6 and on the Wall Street Journal’s 
opinion page, John Fund labeled the move “a coup” fomented by a cabal of 
communications communists.7 
On the left, the reaction was also hostile, with the consensus that the 
Order had little substance and failed to deliver a meaningful network 
neutrality regulation.8 Given that President Obama’s campaign promised to 
enact strong network protection, cries of betrayal echoed through the 
Internet activist community.9 
                                                                                                             
2.  Id. at paras. 62–69. 
3.  Id. 
 4. Cecilia Kang, FCC Approves Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:47 A.M.), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/12/21/AR2010122106110.html. 
 5. Chloe Albanesius, Republicans Vow to Take Down FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules, 
PCMAG.COM (Dec. 22, 2010, 4:25 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2374661,00 
.asp. 
 6.  Cecilia King, Sen. Hutchison Moves to Block Funds for FCC on Net Neutrality 
Rules, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:56 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/ 
2010/12/senator_kay_bailey_hutchison_r.html. 
 7.  John Fund, The Net Neutrality Coup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703886904576031512110086694.html. 
 8. See, e.g., Press Release, FCC Net Neutrality Order Falls Short (Dec. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/public-knowledge-fcc-net-neutrality-order-
falls-sh (“[T]he Commission could have established clear rules that would give more 
protections to Internet users than the one approved today. Instead, these rules will be subject 
to manipulation by telephone and cable companies.”); Press Release, Free Press, Free Press: 
FCC Net Neutrality Order a ‘Squandered Opportunity’ (Dec. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.freepress.net/press-release/2010/12/21/free-press-fcc-net-neutrality-order-
%E2%80%98squandered-opport unity%E2%80%99 (“We are deeply disappointed that the 
chairman chose to ignore the overwhelming public support for real Net Neutrality, instead 
moving forward with industry-written rules that will for the first time in Internet history 
allow discrimination online. This proceeding was a squandered opportunity to enact clear, 
meaningful rules to safeguard the Internet’s level playing field and protect consumers.”). 
 9. See Dan Gillmor, The FCC’s Weak New “Open Internet” Rules, SALON.COM (Dec. 
21, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/21/fcc_network_neutrality. 
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The beating of breasts and gnashing of teeth seemed excessive, even 
bizarre, given the esoteric regulation at issue. After all, as insiders and 
telecommunication specialists know, the Order itself has big loopholes, 
such as exempting wireless, rendering it close to toothless.10 More 
significantly, it stands on weak jurisdictional grounds that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is not likely to uphold.11 That the Order, likely 
never to be law, should cause the policy “Chicken Littles” to see falling 
skies suggests mass confusion or perhaps, more cynically, efforts to 
influence the appellate outcome. 
In this context, Stanford University professor Barbara van Schewick’s 
book, Internet Architecture and Innovation,12 could not be more timely. It 
defends Internet regulation, like that which the FCC recently promulgated, 
as necessary to control Comcast’s, Verizon’s, and other broadband 
providers’ anticompetitive tendencies13 and, above all, to ensure the 
optimal amount of innovation.14 Van Schewick is a one-time colleague of 
Larry Lessig, who popularized the “law as code” idea15 and is a long-time 
advocate of the “end-to-end” Internet design principle discussed below. 
Van Schewick’s prominent role in Internet debates—the FCC’s Order cites 
and relies on her work in several instances—will make Internet 
Architecture an important and influential contribution within Internet 
policy debates.  
In a nutshell, van Schewick argues that (1) the Internet’s “original” 
so-called “broad” e2e architecture16 enables all applications; (2) real 
options economic theory suggests that Internet architecture should enable 
                                                                                                             
10.  Nate Anderson, Wireless Gets a Free Pass on New Neutrality, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 
1, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/ throttle-away.ars. 
11.  The Order bases its authority on Title I of the Communications Act, which the D.C. 
Circuit recently ruled as failing to give the FCC authority to regulate Comcast’s blocking of 
peer-to-peer Internet traffic. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652–54, 660–61 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). Verizon has already appealed the Order. Amy Schatz, Verizon Appeals Net 
Regulations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870 
4747904576094354292080580.html. 
 12. BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010). 
13.  See id. at 233. 
 14. Id. at 388 (“If the Internet’s value for society is to be preserved, policy makers will 
have to intervene.”). Frustratingly, van Schewick does not answer the $64,000 question of 
how they should intervene, but does tell us that “potential policy interventions will have to 
be more sophisticated than simply requiring network providers to adhere to the broad 
version of the end-to-end arguments . . . . [but] the broad version is at least a serious 
contender to be one of the design principles for the future Internet.” Id. at 388–89. 
 15.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
16.  Van Schewick distinguishes two versions of e2e: “the narrow version only applies 
to some functions within a system, the broad version applies to the complete functionality of 
a system.” VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 38. 
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as many different innovators as possible; (3) “modular” Internet design 
reduces coordination and transaction costs of innovation; (4) dominant 
network operators have the incentive to discriminate against competing 
applications providers even if they are more innovative; and (5) 
evolutionary economic theory suggests more diverse innovators will 
provide better innovation.17 Van Schewick then concludes that Internet 
regulation—of the sort the FCC just mandated in its Order—is necessary to 
protect Internet innovation.18 
Internet Architecture’s fatal weakness is that none of the areas of 
economics on which van Schewick builds her argument lends itself to 
simple conclusions. Disregarding ambiguity in the economic models on 
which she relies, van Schewick strings together overbroad claims and 
questionable conclusions to construct Internet Architecture. She uses 
economic theories to support conclusions, but too often neglects to show in 
a rigorous way why the assumptions that allow the models to produce her 
results are more believable than opposing ones. Instead, she uses anecdotes 
to demonstrate theory. While case studies and narrative may be highly 
effective tools of persuasion, formal economic models are designed for 
rigorous econometrics (i.e., properly sampled and controlled data). As the 
old saw goes, the plural of anecdote is not data. When legal academics 
claim the power of the social science game, they need to keep its rules. 
Van Schewick shows that some economic models suggest that 
Internet regulation may enhance innovation. But she does not attempt to 
address her myriad models’ ambiguities or examine data rigorously to 
conclude whether this result is at all likely. Given that Internet Architecture 
uses economic analysis to justify the specific public prescription of 
regulating the Internet, this shortcoming is not minor. To paraphrase David 
Hume, “maybe” does not imply “ought.”19  
Professor van Schewick is not alone. Internet Architecture sadly 
enters a long syllabus errorum of interdisciplinary legal 
telecommunications scholarship.20 Thus, a close examination of van 
                                                                                                             
17.  VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 299. 
18. Id. at 373–75. 
 19.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 320 (Batoche Books, 1999) 
(1739) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is 
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.”) 
(emphasis added). 
20.  See infra note 68 for a discussion of the work of professor Christopher Yoo. 
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Schewick’s argument leads to recommendations applicable to legal 
interdisciplinary research method generally. 
Building on Lessig’s work, van Schewick’s work first distinguishes 
between what she calls the “broad” and “narrow” versions of the e2e 
network design principle.21 For nondevotees of Internet wonkery, e2e 
network design requires that “intelligence” (i.e., application functions) 
should be located at its “ends” (i.e., the users).22 The protocols that 
exchange information between users do not do much except transport.23 
This allows individuals to build-on new applications that can still network 
and communicate. 
To get a sense of what this means, compare e2e network design to its 
predecessor, the Bell Public Switched Telephone Network (“Bell PSTN”) 
(i.e., how we all communicated before 1995 or so). With e2e, the network 
smarts are widely distributed and modular. Taking advantage of the 
Internet’s common transport function, users can independently add 
applications and functions. In the Bell PSTN, by contrast, all the 
intelligence resided at the switch (i.e., the central place in the network that 
the telephone company controls). 24 End-users could not add functions; 
instead, the phone company provided all services (such as voice 
communications, voicemail, call waiting, speed dialing, and 800 services) 
centrally.25 
Notice the tradeoff between e2e and centralized, integrated designs 
such as the phone network or cable system. Some network functions 
require greater coordination and centralization than e2e can provide. For 
instance, the Internet can neither provide the old telephone network’s level 
of security or quality of service, nor match cable systems’ video delivery 
capacity. But the telephone system limits potential uses that e2e permits.26 
Different networks perform some functions better than others. 
                                                                                                             
21.  VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 41. 
22.  Id. at 88–91. 
23.  Id. at 56. 
24.  JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN 
TELECOM POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 170 (2005). 
25.  Id. 
26.  Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 933 (2001) (“The 
Internet's design principles are different from the design principles that governed the 
telephone . . . the telephone network was not governed by the Internet's principle of e2e. It 
was instead governed by a different end-to-end philosophy--that the telephone company 
controlled the network from end to end. This meant that AT&T would not be neutral about 
the uses to which the telephone system could be put. For much of the history of the 
telephone network, it was forbidden to use the network in ways not specified by AT&T. It 
was a unlawful, for example, to attach devices that performed services not offered by AT&T 
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Larry Lessig and Mark Lemley famously argued that e2e plays a 
necessary role in Internet innovating.27 Their argument has great appeal. 
Indeed, the Internet allows program developers to build the applications 
that define contemporary life—from email and Facebook to Google and 
YouTube. Innovators can distribute their creations without approval from 
(or coordination with) providers like Verizon or Comcast. Rather, the 
Internet protocol “dumbly” provides transport to the ends doing the 
application-specific computation. Lessig and Lemley argued that we should 
protect this vitality from Comcast’s or Verizon’s anticompetitive desire to 
control matters centrally—transforming the Internet into cable television or 
the old telephone system.28 This general policy prescription was known as 
“network neutrality” and it was what December’s controversial FCC Order 
mandated (in an addlepated form). 
Building on Lessig and Lemley, van Schewick identifies two different 
versions of the e2e argument: the narrow and the broad. The narrow 
version has a presumption that a “function should not be implemented in a 
lower layer, if it cannot be completely and correctly implemented at that 
layer.”29 In other words, the smarts (the error detection and other protocols 
necessary to run real live applications) should be at the edges when such 
placement would not impair an application’s performance. In contrast, the 
broad version states that “a function or service should be carried out within 
a network layer [i.e., available to all clients of the network] only if it is 
needed by all clients of that layer.”30 Put another way, under van 
Schewick’s broad analysis, if a function is needed by all applications, it 
must be at a lower level to be available to all. 
Van Schewick then argues for her broad e2e architecture as the 
regulation’s guiding principle. Even before reaching analysis of van 
Schewick’s use of economics, this claim is fraught. First, it is not clear that 
any network designer ever adopted the broad e2e architecture. As the 
quotation from Lessig and Lemley suggests, it was never a formalized rule, 
but rather an idea that emerged after years of network design, and arguably 
                                                                                                             
or to provide services that competed with the services provided by AT&T.”). 
 27.  Id. at 930 (“The e2e argument organizes the placement of functions within a 
network. It counsels that the “intelligence” in a network should be located at the top of a 
layered system—at its “ends,” where users put information and applications onto the 
network.”). 
28.  Id. at 936–38.  
29. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting LARRY L. PETERSON & BRUCE S. 
DAVIE, COMPUTER NETWORKS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 387 (4th ed. 2007)). 
30. Id. at 67 (internal quotations omitted). 
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was never implemented anywhere.31 Lacking descriptive weight, the claim 
must be entirely prescriptive.  
Second, and much more critically, van Schewick’s definition contains 
circularity and could, in fact, chill innovation. This is a key question, given 
van Schewick’s central goal of protecting innovation. Because the broad 
version of e2e would require every existing application to have access to 
Internet transport functionality, it could entrench existing applications and 
chill the development of applications requiring some specialization at the 
network level. Further, van Schewick could mean that networks should 
support any potential network application. If this is her meaning, she in 
effect converts the Internet design into a tremendous subsidy (and 
innovation disincentive) from network builders to application designers. 
Near the end of Internet Architecture, van Schewick recognizes this 
subsidy, which she sees as a tradeoff between “long-term evolvability” of 
new applications32 and what she terms “short-term performance 
optimizations.”33 She argues that we should prefer long-term evolvability, 
because “there are many more applications that have yet to be invented, 
which makes the long-term evolvability of the network more important 
than short-term performance optimizations.”34 
It is not clear, however, that the potential of future applications 
justifies any particular architecture. Maybe important new innovations 
require short-term performance optimization. There are things, such as 
guaranteeing quality of service or providing better security and streaming 
video, that current Internet design does not do as well as the telephone 
networks or cable systems. After all, many innovations that people like, 
such as the Kindle or the iPad, appear to violate the broad version of 
network neutrality because they do require specialized network and 
transport functions, rendering their functionality resistant to modular 
innovation that the broad e2e protects. If van Schewick cannot say why 
long-term innovation is better than other types, her regulatory prescription 
based on her preference for long-term evolvability loses its power. 
After defining broad e2e, van Schewick turns to economics to show 
that this broad version leads to greater innovation. First, she asks whether 
there is an optimal level of innovation.35 For this, she looks to real options 
theory, a branch of economics that borrows from finance and portfolio 
theory by viewing actual investments as bets (not unlike options) on future 
                                                                                                             
31.   See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 32.  VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 389.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
35.  See, e.g., id. at 115–22. 
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value.36 She envisions the Internet as a portfolio of investments—of real 
options.37 In a novel and interesting move, she then asks what type of 
network architecture would maximize value.38 
Not surprisingly, van Schewick concludes that the broad e2e allows 
for greater diversity of investments, which portfolio theory would prefer.39 
She argues that broad e2e lowers the cost of innovation because it increases 
modularity, the ability of parts of the Internet to develop independently.40 
Modularity “enables innovation . . . . [that] do[es] not affect the rest of the 
system,” allowing for adoption of innovations that do not require systemic 
network change.41 And thus, investments in modular networks have lower 
costs. Further, the rate of change in modular networks will increase with 
uncertainty because “modular architecture enables innovators to capture the 
potentially large benefits associated with risky projects and avoid the 
downsides.”42 
Van Schewick’s reliance on real options theory is misplaced. She is 
no doubt correct that broad e2e encourages more investment (and 
presumably innovation), but only innovation of a certain type—little 
innovations that do not require greater changes in the network. In other 
words, broad e2e encourages only those innovations that do not need 
specialization at the transport layer or other layers. Conversely, modular 
architecture makes innovations requiring a high level of coordination, such 
as those involving security or quality of service, more expensive. But, just 
as no one knows if long-term evolvability is better than short-term 
optimization, no one knows whether little innovations requiring little 
change in the network are more valuable from an investment perspective 
than big innovations that affect the entire Internet. 
Van Schewick next looks to transaction cost economics to defend the 
broad version of Internet architecture. Led by Oliver Williamson and 
others, this branch of economics looks to the costs of information between 
employees and contracting parties.43 It asks why some transactions are 
performed within a firm and others by arm’s length market dealings 
                                                                                                             
36.  Id. at 124. 
37.  Id. at 125. 
38.  See id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 125–26. 
 41. Id. at 125 (citation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 127; see also id. at 145 (“According to real-options analysis, hidden modules 
with low core costs of innovation may justify a large number of parallel approaches aimed 
at improving the module . . . .”). 
43. See Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
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between firms. There are costs and efficiencies associated with both types 
of transactions. Intrafirm dealings permit lower monitoring costs.44 They 
function well in endeavors with high coordination costs, but create agency 
problems (i.e., employees will do what employers want but may take 
advantage of them in other ways). Arm’s length transactions can eliminate 
agency costs and work well in endeavors with low coordination costs, but 
they present higher monitoring costs (i.e., firms typically do not have 
closely coordinated operations with independent contractors, but do have to 
make sure that they are not being sold a bill of goods).45  
Van Schewick argues that modular architecture creates a “cost 
structure [that] lets a wide range of innovators with diverse motivations and 
funding models develop new applications.”46 Further, she asserts that “the 
architecture of the Internet” makes “arm’s-length relationships and vertical 
integration among providers of different components [] equally feasible.”47 
Here, she seems to say that modular architecture offers a sort of 
Williamsonian free lunch. Modularity allows for more actors to innovate 
and produce applications more cheaply, without raising coordination costs 
above those that an integrated firm faces. 
This claim is quite expansive and potentially quite important. Perhaps 
it is true, perhaps it is not. However, the economic models van Schewick 
cites do not demonstrate this importance.48 Van Schewick does not provide 
any formal modeling, but instead she supports her claim with many 
anecdotes.49 No one can doubt there has been tremendous innovation under 
modular Internet design pursuant to arm’s length transactions. But, again, it 
has been innovation of a certain type—that which requires minimal 
coordination. People may want innovations that require greater network 
integration.  
Van Schewick then confronts the central question of Internet 
regulation: assuming that the broad e2e architecture provides more 
innovation, do broadband providers, like Comcast or Verizon, have the 
economic incentive to support the broad e2e design?50 And, if they do not, 
                                                                                                             
44.  See generally id. at 238–45. 
 45. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). 
 46. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 205. 
47.  Id. at 202. 
 48. She cites to a dizzying array of economists. Her principal citations to modularity 
and innovation, CARLISS YOUNG BALDWIN AND KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER 
OF MODULARITY VOL. 1, (2000), do not make such sweeping arguments. While Baldwin and 
Clarke do examine conditions in which modularity is optimal, application of their ideas to 
current Internet markets is not clear. 
49.  See generally VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 297–353. 
50.  Id. at 337. 
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van Schewick asks whether government should mandate network 
regulation, as in the FCC’s recently released Order, to counter these 
anticompetitive tendencies.51 Van Schewick says that foreclosure is likely 
and regulation necessary.52 
The question of whether Comcast or Verizon will allow a thousand 
innovative applications to bloom—or whether they will block 
competitors—is the economic question of network regulation and a 
perennial question in economic theory. 
The laissez faire opponents of Internet regulation point to the “single 
monopoly” rent theorem to argue against Internet regulation.53 They argue 
that because Comcast is already receiving monopoly rents for providing 
broadband, it can maximize profits by providing the most valuable and 
diverse offerings.54 Building on this argument, economists argue that the 
monopolists can internalize complementary efficiencies and thereby 
provide content more efficiently than the nonmonopolists.55 
Economic models for foreclosure are various, complex, and, given 
that economists write them, ambiguous in their application. Further, as 
some legal scholars point out, focusing on market power only in the last 
mile mischaracterizes the Internet market.56 The Internet is more than 
Comcast’s and Verizon’s control of the last mile. The Internet includes the 
host of backbone providers that constitute the network (the “Internet 
                                                                                                             
51.  Id. at 345–47. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Davina Sashkin, Failure Of Imagination: Why Inaction On Net Neutrality 
Regulation Will Result In A De Facto Legal Regime Promoting Discrimination And 
Consumer Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 297 (2006) (“For example, a company 
selling monopolized broadband Internet service bundled with a portal service could, per the 
‘one monopoly rent’ theory, only collect one monopoly price for the bundled service; 
because the company controls the underlying facility and can therefore charge the monopoly 
price for access to it, monopolizing the complementary portal market would not offer 
additional profit.”). 
54.  Id. 
 55. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 103 (2003) (“ICE [the internalizing complementary efficiency 
theory] maintains that the platform monopolist cannot increase its overall profit by 
monopolizing the applications market, because it could always have charged consumers a 
higher platform price in the first place; it has no incentive to take profits or inefficiently 
hamper or exclude rivals in the applications market because it can appropriate the benefits 
of cheap and attractive applications in its pricing of the platform. To the contrary, ICE 
claims that a platform monopolist has an incentive to innovate and push for improvements 
in its system — including better applications — in order to profit from a more valuable 
platform.”). 
 56. See Adam Candeub & Daniel J. McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 493 (2012). 
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cloud”).57 By ignoring market dynamics deep within the Internet cloud, van 
Schewick relies exclusively on vertical foreclosure models that arguably 
have little relationship to reality.58 
Van Schewick recognizes this ambiguity. Nonetheless, she states that 
“some general observations are possible,”59 including that the monopolist 
broadband provider will use discriminatory pricing to increase its profits to 
“disadvantag[e] certain classes of applications”60 and that this “reduce[s] 
the profits of independent developers of complementary products, thus 
reducing their incentives to innovate.”61 Van Schewick recognizes, but 
minimizes, the inherent theoretical ambiguity that weakens her argument.62 
This whole section jars the reader. Van Schewick describes, in great 
detail, exceptions to the single monopoly rent theorem.63 But she follows, 
with little argument, as to whether these exceptions in fact apply to the 
Internet. Such argument would require teasing apart the multitude of 
foreclosure models, identifying their assumptions, and using the best 
empirical data to see which sets of assumptions best fit the data. The 
seriousness of van Schewick’s work, and her own scholarly ambitions, 
require her to take these additional steps. 
Finally, van Schewick argues that decentralized architectures create 
more innovation, looking to evolutionary economics to make her point.64 
Evolutionary economics models innovation like natural evolution. It breaks 
from traditional economics in that it assumes that actors work under 
Knightean uncertainty.65 Economics generally holds that actors can 
estimate risk; Knightean uncertainty holds that risk is not susceptible to 
estimation.66 In other words, Knightean uncertainty holds that actors know 
future events are uncertain, but cannot attach a number to their probability 
of occurrence. As in blind evolution, evolutionary economics predicts that 
                                                                                                             
57.   Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network 
Neutrality Debate, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 461, 474 & n.47 (2007) (“The Internet cloud refers to 
the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provider users with 
seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks.”). 
58.   Id. 
59.   VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 277.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 281.  
 62.  Id. at 471 n.238. 
63.  See id. at 230–62. 
64.  See id. at 280–82. 
 65. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 289 (2010) (“Knight . . 
. distinguished . . . between calculable risk—risk to which a numerical probability can be 
assigned . . . —and uncertainty, to which a numerical probability and distribution cannot be 
assigned with any confidence that it is correct.”). 
66.  Id. 
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better results come from diverse populations. Van Schewick claims “[n]ot 
only will a large, diverse group of potential innovators discover a larger 
number of opportunities for innovation than a small group of homogenous 
network providers; they will also realize a larger number of the 
opportunities that were discovered.”67 Thus, van Schewick concludes 
regulation must ensure network neutrality to ensure a diversity of 
innovation. 
Van Schewick is probably correct that evolutionary economics shows 
in general that greater diversity leads to greater innovation. But 
evolutionary economics in no way points to the optimal level of innovation. 
Investment costs money. There is a tradeoff between this cost and the 
payoff from innovation investment, including opportunity costs. Van 
Schewick fails to acknowledge that at some point there is a diminishing 
return to investing in diversity. She therefore cannot say when the benefit 
of preserving broad e2e exceeds its costs. 
Further, van Schewick’s reliance on evolutionary economics and its 
Knightean uncertainty to determine the value of Internet investment leads 
to another contradiction. She previously relied on real options theory, 
which explicitly assumes that risk for Internet applications can be 
estimated. Either uncertainty in Internet application development resists 
estimation, or it does not. Switching bedrock theoretical assumptions 
undermines the power of both analyses. 
Van Schewick has shown that it is plausible that her broad e2e 
promotes innovation. The weakness of her economic analyses, for 
economists, is that she pays too little attention to the likelihood of her 
claim’s correctness. Under certain conditions, her economic conclusions 
may be correct. But, van Schewick does not investigate in a rigorous way 
what those conditions are or how likely they are. Indeed, even if we posit a 
two-thirds chance that she is correct about each step in her argument, the 
odds that she would be correct on all steps would be quite low. 
This critique of van Schewick’s work is applicable to a distressing 
amount of law and economics research, perhaps because of foundational 
differences in methodology. When an economist develops a model, the 
model formalizes an intuition, showing the precise parameters and 
assumptions for which it is valid. Surprising theoretical results expand our 
understanding of the logically and mathematically possible mechanisms 
working in the world.   
Legal academics, however, must go beyond the merely possible and 
show the advisability of a given rule. This requires insight into likelihood. 
                                                                                                             
 67.  VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 301. 
Number 3] REVIEW ESSAY 673 
In its selective use of economic theory, Internet Architecture is sadly not 
alone. Rather, it reflects a disturbing, perhaps endemic trend in 
communications legal scholarship—on both the right and left—to latch on 
to some model, treat it as truth, and avoid critically engaging its limitations 
and assumptions.68 
                                                                                                             
 68.  Christopher Yoo, fierce opponent of network neutrality regulation and van 
Schewick’s ideological enantiomer, often does the same thing. To take one particularly 
glaring example, Yoo’s articles on Fifth Amendment regulatory takings all depend upon 
what is known as the efficient component pricing rule (“ECPR”). See, e.g., Daniel F. 
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional 
Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 993–96 (2003) [hereinafter Spulber & Yoo, Access 
to Networks]. This theory holds that when a regulator mandates interconnection between a 
competitor and incumbent network (i.e., a formerly regulated monopolist such as AT&T), 
the price the competitor pays must include “lost profits” that the monopolist was not 
permitted to make during its regulated existence. Id. Or, as Yoo puts it:  
  The proper cost valuation of making an input available is the direct cost of 
the input plus the reduction in the value of the output. Thus, prices set at 
economic cost of an input must represent the sum of the direct incremental cost 
of providing the input and the opportunity costs associated with providing the 
input to a competitor.  
Id. at 906; see also Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of 
Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 95–96 (2008) (advocating 
EPCR); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as 
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1713 n 53 (2005) 
(advocating EPCR). Spulber and Yoo go so far as to argue that the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause mandates use of EPCR by regulators. Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, 
supra, at 1023–24. Incumbent telephone companies, of course, adore this theory because it 
requires new entrants to pay very high interconnection rates, but the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the ECPR. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 514 (2002). 
Leading scholars have also thoroughly debunked the ECPR as a rule that the Constitution 
mandates. See Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and 
Expectations in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1313 (2006) (“The 
futile effort to constitutionalize any ratemaking rule, let alone a backward-looking 
methodology that repudiates decades of regulatory wisdom, runs into the teeth of Supreme 
Court doctrine.”). But for the purposes of this Review, what is significant is that 
economists’ opinions are, to say the least, highly mixed about ECPR’s theoretical validity. 
In the words of Nicholas Economides, an international leader in the field of network 
economics at the New York University,  
“In economics, typically ‘efficient’ is meant to be ‘socially efficient,’ that is, 
maximizing total social welfare or total surplus. Does the ECPR or the M-
ECPR, in general, maximize social surplus? Absolutely not! Although the rule 
has been debated for the last 18 years, neither its creators nor its present 
supporters have ever provided a proof that the use of either of these two rules 
maximizes social surplus . . . .”  
Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE WIRE: 
STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 142, 
144 (Allan L. Shampine ed., 2003). Yet, one searches in vain in Yoo’s writings for an 
acknowledgement of the limits of the theory he espouses with such vigor. Despite their 
ideological differences, both he and van Schewick base their legal scholarship on blinkered 
economic predicates.  
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Well, so what? Lawyers and judges selectively use expert economic 
opinions and their models, so why not legal academics? Yet legal 
academics have a duty to get at the right answer, not simply advocate a 
model. This requires recognizing a model’s limitations, assumptions, and, 
above all, likely applicability to the real world. Failure to adhere to this 
principle diminishes legal scholarship. When legal scholars forcefully 
assert that some other field has clear and valuable insights for the law, as 
van Schewick does,69 they are usually addressing a scholarly audience 
without background in that other field. Without explicitly teasing out the 
limits of their theories, such scholarship incompletely engages the 
readership, potentially reducing scholarly debate to slogans or ideological 
predilection now resting on the mystique and irrefutability of another 
discipline. 
This returns us to where this review started—the absurdly partisan 
debate surrounding network neutrality. Legal scholarship could bring some 
lux to the aetas through critical examination of economic models of 
Internet behavior and empirical data, in order to analyze their implications 
for regulation. Shoehorning the Internet into economic models that serve 
one particular ideological view hardly achieves that goal. Legal scholarship 
must do better. 
 
                                                                                                             
 69. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 2 (“After decades of research on innovation, we 
understand how changes in law, in norms, or in prices affect the economic environment for 
innovation and how they affect innovators’ decisions to innovate.”). 
